



M/A-COM Wireless Systems
Cryptographic Library (SECLIB)
Security Policy
R9

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1 Introduction

This is a non-proprietary security policy for the M/A-COM Wireless Systems Cryptographic Library. It describes how the module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 (Ref. [1]) and how to securely operate the module in a FIPS compliant manner. This policy was prepared as part of the level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the cryptographic module.

1.1 References

- [1] *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*, FIPS 140-2, Information Technology Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg MD, May 25, 2001.
- [2] *M/A-COM SECDLL Application Programmer's Interface Specification*, <PUBLICATION INFORMATION TBSL>.
- [3] *Advanced Encryption Standard*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (FIPS PUB 197) November 26,2001..
- [4] *Data Encryption Standard*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3 (Withdrawn) (FIPS PUB 46-3) October 25, 1999.
- [5] *Secure Hash Standard*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 (FIPS PUB 180-2), August 2002.
- [6] *TIA/EIA-102.AAAD, Project 25 Block Encryption Protocol*, Telecommunications Industry Association, July 2002.
- [7] *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques*, Morris Dworkin, National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition.
- [8] *HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication*, Internet RFC 2104, Krawczyk, et. al., February 1997.
- [9] *The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198 (FIPS PUB 198), March 6, 2002.
- [10] *AES Key Wrap Specification*, 16-November-2001.
- [11] *NIST-Recommended Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 Using 3-Key Triple DES and AES Algorithms*, Sharon S. Keller, NIST/ITL/CSD, January 2005.

1.2 Abbreviations

| | |
|-------------|---|
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard (Ref. [3]) |
| API | Application Programmer's Interface |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining Mode |
| CO | Crypto-Officer |
| CRNG | Continuous Random Number Generator (Test) |
| CSP | Cryptographic Security Parameter |
| CTR | Counter Mode |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard (Ref. [4]) |
| DLL | Dynamic Link Library |
| ECB | Electronic Code Book Mode |
| HMAC-SHA1 | Hash Message Authentication Code based on SHA1 (Ref. [9]) |
| HMAC-SHA256 | HMAC employing SHA-256 |
| KAT | Known Answer Test |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| OFB | Output Feedback Mode |
| OS | Operating System |
| P25 | APCO Project 25 |
| PRNG | Pseudo-Random Number Generator |
| SEC DLL | Security Library DLL |
| SECLIB | Security Library – The subject cryptographic module. |
| SHA1 | Secure Hash Standard (Ref. [5]) |
| SHA256 | Secure Hash Standard (Ref. [5]) with 256-bit result. |

2 Cryptographic Module Overview

2.1 Operating Environment & Module Interfaces

The SECLIB version R1A is a software cryptographic library and is evaluated as a multi-chip, standalone module. It runs in the operational environment of a standard Intel-based computer running the Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 operating system. The cryptographic module boundary is the case of the computer, containing the integrated circuits of the motherboard, the CPU, random access memory, keyboard, mouse, video interfaces, hard drive, and other hardware components.

The module is packaged as a dynamically loaded library (DLL) which contains all of the module's executable code. The SECLIB DLL module performs all of its own FIPS required operations.

The M/A-COM security library was tested on the following platforms:

Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2

Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2




Figure 1 – Generic Computer Hardware Functional Block Diagram

Figure 1 shows the functional block diagram for the computer on which the SECLIB module runs. All components shown in the diagram are within the physical cryptographic boundary of the module, and the diagram shows interconnections among the major components of the module. Dashed lines represent connections to equipment or components outside the cryptographic boundary.

Software is stored on the hard drive of the system, and loaded into random access memory for execution.




Figure 2 – Diagram of the Module

Figure 2 illustrates the cryptographic module. As provided, the module consists of two disk images comprising an image of the SECLIB Dynamic Link Library, and a certificate file. Upon invocation of the DLL, the certificate file is employed by the DLL to perform a software integrity test. The DLL is then able to provide nine cryptographic service classes and two non-cryptographic service classes, as summarized in Table 1.

2.1.1 Physical Interfaces

The physical interfaces are those of a standard Intel-based computer system, including the computer keyboard and mouse, network ports, CD-ROM drive, video monitor port, and power plug. All port connectors used in the module are standard. The system has a serial port which is not used.

2.1.2 Logical Interfaces

The logical interface to the module is the Application Programming Interface (API) of the software library. The module sends and receives data entirely through the API defined in the Reference [2]. The module provides for control input through the API calls. Data Input and Output are provided in variables passed with API calls, and Status Output is provided through function return values, exception function callbacks, and error codes that are documented for each provided service.

Each service class consists of a collection of API calls providing particular cryptographic or non-cryptographic functions.

The operating system controls separation of these logical interfaces when the module communicates over the same physical interfaces. Logical interfaces are separated by the structure of the API and the definition of the interfaces. Each input is directed to a particular API call and each output returned from a particular API call.

The operating environment obtains data from various sources, including network and keyboard interfaces, and prepares that data to become input to the software module. The data might be stored on the hard disk before being used as input data.

| Service Class | Crypto | Description |
|---------------------|--------|--|
| Ciphers | Yes | Primitive functions implementing the AES, DES ¹ and Triple-DES ciphers. |
| Digests | Yes | Primitive functions providing the SHA1 and SHA-256 message digests. |
| Schemes | Yes | Functions providing encryption schemes (ECB, CTR, CBC, etc) based on the ciphers of the Cipher service class. |
| MACs | Yes | Functions providing message authentication codes (HMAC, CBC-MAC) based on the primitive Digest and Cipher service classes. |
| Key Wrap | Yes | Functions providing key wrap functions based on the Cipher service class. |
| PRNGs | Yes | Functions providing one FIPS approved and one Non-FIPS approved random number generators. |
| KATs | Yes | Functions providing known answer tests. |
| FIPS Support | Yes | Functions providing access to the FIPS status of the module. |
| S/W Integrity Tests | Yes | Functions providing the software integrity test for the module. |
| Application Support | No | Functions providing checksums and other arithmetic capabilities that are non-cryptographic. |
| Utility | No | Various non-cryptographic utility functions. |

Table 1- Service Class Summary

¹ DES is used only in the Non-FIPS mode of operation.

| Type | Logical Interface | Information/Purpose |
|---------------|--------------------------|--|
| Data Input | IVs | Initial Vectors for cryptographic schemes and MACs. Initial vectors are not CSPs. |
| | Keys | Plain-text keys provided to the module for encryption and authentication functions. Keys are CSPs. |
| | Plaintext | Plaintext to be encrypted. |
| | Ciphertext | Encrypted plaintext. |
| | Message Text | Data for with a MAC or message digest is to be computed. |
| | KEK | A Key encryption Key used to encrypt keys using keywrapping. KEKs are CSPs. |
| | Key to Wrap | A key to be wrapped using keywrapping. |
| | Initialization Data | Random initialization data used to initialize a PRNG. Initialization data is a CSP. |
| | App. Status | The FIPS status of the application using SECLIB. |
| | App. CB (callback) | A point to a function that is notified of changes in the FIPS status of SECLIB. |
| | Non-Crypto Inputs | Various information of a non-cryptographic nature supplied as inputs to support and utility functions. |
| Control Input | Zeroize | A command to zeroize CSPs present in state variables. |
| | KAT Control | Function invocations for Known Answer tests. |
| | FIPS Mode Control | Function invocations and data commanding a particular FIPS operating mode. |
| | Test Invocation | Invocations of Software Integrity tests. |
| Data Output | Ciphertext | Encrypted plaintext. |
| | Plaintext | Decrypted ciphertext. |
| | Message Digest | The result of the computation of a message digest (such as SHA1) on message text. |
| | MAC | The result of the computation of a message authentication code (such as HMAC-SHA1) on message text. |
| | Wrapped Key | A key wrapped in accordance with ref. [10]. |
| | PR Numbers | Pseudo-random numbers |
| | Errorlog | A recording of error conditions encountered by the module, reportable to an invoking application. |
| | Non-Crypto Outputs | Various non-cryptographic outputs of |

| | | |
|---------------|---------------------|--|
| | | support and utility functions. |
| Status Output | Status/FIPS Status | FIP status indicators and function status indicators of cryptographic functions. |
| | KAT Status | Success or failure indicator of Known Answer Tests. |
| | FIPS Status | FIPS Status |
| | Status (Non-Crypto) | Non-cryptographic function status indicators. |
| | Test Status | The result of a software integrity test. |
| Power | None | N/A |

Table 2- Interface Summary

2.2 Cryptographic Algorithms

The following table lists the cryptographic algorithms supported by SECLIB DLL:

| Algorithm | Validation Certificate | Applicability |
|--|------------------------|---|
| AES (ECB, CBC, OFB, CTR) | #637 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| AES-MAC (vendor affirmed, non-compliant) | N/A | Non-FIPS mode |
| DES (ECB, CBC, OFB, CTR) | N/A | Non-FIPS mode |
| DES-MAC | N/A | Non-FIPS mode |
| Triple-DES (ECB, CBC, OFB, CTR) | #591 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| SHA-1 | #673 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| HMAC-SHA1 | #328 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| SHA-256 | #673 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| HMAC-SHA256 | #328 | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| ANSI X.91 (AES) PRNG (Ref.[11]) | #363 | FIPS and Non-FIPS mode |
| SHA1 Based PRNG | N/A | Non-approved. Allowed in FIPS mode for initial vector generation and to seed the approved PRNG. |
| AES Key Wrap (Ref. [10]) | N/A | FIPS and Non-FIPS modes |
| DES Key Wrap | N/A | Non-FIPS modes |

Table 3- Cryptographic Algorithms

2.3 Self-Tests

SECDLL automatically performs power-up and conditional self-tests on instantiation to ensure proper operation in the FIPS-140-2 compliant mode. Until the power up self tests are completed, no data can be processed by the module. Thus data output and input are inhibited during self testing. If self testing fails, the module will enter an error state and the module instantiation fails. When this occurs, any function calls to the SECLIB module will result in an error and thus data output will not be possible.

2.3.1 Power-up Self Tests

The following sections describe the power-up self-tests of the cryptographic module.

2.3.1.1 Software Integrity Test

SECLIB is delivered from the manufacturer in the form of a windows DLL file with an accompanying certificate file. Upon process instantiation, SECDLL performs a software integrity test as follows:

1. Upon instantiation, the operating system provides the DLL initialization routine with a “handle” that is used by SECLIB to fetch the full pathname of the DLL image.
2. SECLIB assumes that the certificate file resides on the same directory as the DLL image and has the same filename concatenated with the string “cert”.
3. SECLIB opens the certificate, retrieving the encrypted authentication key stored therein.
4. SECLIB decrypts the authentication key using a hard-coded key encryption key.
5. SECLIB then applies the HMAC-SHA1 message authentication code to the DLL image and compares it to the result stored in the certificate.
6. If the two results fail to match, the module enters the error state. Otherwise, it proceeds with the Known Answer Tests described below.

Any attempt to enter the approved FIPS mode following a failure of the software integrity test causes a transition into the FIPS_FAILED state.

2.3.1.2 Known Answer Tests

Upon process instantiation and upon entry into the FIPS approved mode, SECLIB performs Known Answer Tests (KATs) on the following cryptographic services:

- AES in ECB, CTR, CBC, and OFB modes with 128, 192 and 256 bit keys.
- Triple-DES in ECB, CTR, CBC and OFB modes.
- SHA-1
- HMAC-SHA-1
- SHA-256
- HMAC-SHA-256
- X9.31 PRNG

- AES Key wrap KAT

KATs are also made available at the API of SECLIB module to allow the user to confirm the validity of the cryptographic algorithms at any time.

If the module is in the FIPS approved mode, then failure of any KAT produces a transition to the FIPS_FAILED state.

2.3.2 Conditional Self-Tests

SECLIB module performs the CRNG conditional self-test. Each time either of its random number generators is used to produce pseudo-random data, the module performs the continuous random number generator test. If the module is operating in the FIPS approved mode, then failure of the test produces a transition into the FIPS_FAILED state, followed by transition to the FIPS state after reseeding. In addition, the PRNGs require seeding before being used to generate pseudo-random numbers. Failure of the user to seed the PRNG prior to operation likewise causes a transition to the FIPS_FAILED state.

2.3.3 Critical Function Tests

SECLIB has no additional critical functions to test.

3 Security Policy

3.1 Identification and Authentication Policy

As allowed by FIPS 140-2 for Level 1 certification, SECLIB does not support user identification or authentication for any of its identified roles.

3.2 Access Control Policy

3.2.1 Supported Roles

SECLIB supports two roles, the Crypto-User (User) role and the Crypto-Officer (CO) role. These roles are implicitly assumed by the calling application. SECLIB does not support multi-threading, so only one role may be active at a time.

An operator assuming the CO role can call any of the module's functions. An operator assuming the User role can call any of the module's functions except those identified in Section 3.2.2 as pertaining only to the CO.

| Role | Type of Authentication | Authentication Data |
|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Crypto-User (User) | None | None |
| Crypto-Officer (CO) | None | None |

Table 4 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

3.2.2 Complete List of Services

The table below provides a complete list of services provided by the DLL and identifies applicable roles.

| Role | Authorized Services | Key/CSP Access | Type(s) of Access ² |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| User and Crypto-Officer | Cipher Service Class | AES Key, Triple-DES Key | R,W |
| | Digest Service Class | None | |
| | Scheme Service Class | AES Key, Triple-DES Key | R,W |
| | MAC Service Class | HMAC Key, AES Key | R,W |
| | Key Wrap Service Class | AES Key | R,W |
| | PRNG Service Class | Seed, Seed Key, AES Key | R,W |
| | FIPS Support Service Class (Including the Show Status Service) | None | |

² R=read, W=write

| | | | |
|---------------------|---|--|------------|
| | Application Support Service Class | None | |
| | Utility Service Class | None | |
| Crypto-Officer Only | Software Integrity Test Service Class (Self-test Service) | HMAC Integrity Key, 256-bit embedded key | R,W |
| | Known Answer Test Service Class (Self-test Service) | None | |
| | Installation | None | W |
| | Uninstallation | None | W (delete) |

Table 5 - Roles and Services

3.2.3 Cryptographic Security Parameters and Keys

SECDLL contains an embedded 256-bit plaintext key used to decrypt the authentication key used for the power-up software integrity test described in Section 2.3.1.1. All other keys employed by SECLIB are provided by the user through API parameters. Each cryptographic service provided by the module provides mechanisms for the zeroization of plaintext keys contained in its supporting data structures. Those services that provide atomic functions for which no key persistence is required to zeroize local copies of keys and related material prior to returning to their calling function.

The user of SECLIB has responsibility for calling the appropriate zeroization functions under the following circumstances:

1. If a key containing SECLIB data structure is allocated on the process stack, zeroization functions must be called prior to returning from a user function.
2. If a key containing SECLIB data structure is allocated in static or global memory, zeroization functions must be called prior to de-instantiation of the process.

The following SECLIB data structures contain keys or derived key material that must be zeroized by the user under the above circumstances:

| CSP | Data Structure | Zeroization Service |
|------------------|--------------------|---|
| AES Key | aes_state | aes_key_expand |
| AES Key | aesmode_state_type | aesmode_keyset |
| AES Key | asp25_state_type | asp25_keyset |
| Triple-DES Key | des_context | des_keyset |
| Triple-DES Key | desmode_state_type | desmode_keyset |
| Triple-DES Key | desp25_state_type | asp25_keyset |
| HMAC SHA-1 Key | hmac_sha1_state | hmac_sha1_start or hmac_sha1_finish |
| HMAC SHA-256 Key | hmac_sha256_state | hmac_sha256_start or hmac_sha256_finish |
| AES Key | aescbmac_state | aescbmac_start or aescbmac_finish |

Table 6 - Data Structures Requiring User Zeroization

3.3 Physical Security Policy

Physical security is provided by the host PC on which SECLIB executes.

3.4 Operational Environment

The module's operational environment is described above, and consists of a commercially available general-purpose hardware computing platform and Windows Operating system configured for use in single-user mode.

While cryptographic processing is in use, keys and CSPs are protected by process separation. When the module starts up, it performs an integrity self-check using the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm.

3.5 Mitigation of Other Attacks

SECLIB provides no special mitigation against other attacks.

4 Secure Operation of the SECLIB Cryptographic Module

Operation of SECLIB in the secure mode is subject to the following rules and policies.

1. A user invokes the secure mode through a call to the *secdll_enable_fips* service. This service requires that the user previously provide a notification callback (via the *secdll_install_fips_callback* service) that allows SECDLL to inform the user of FIPS errors as they occur.
2. A user that wishes to employ either PRNG provided by SECLIB must first establish a seed for the PRNG. Failure to do so while in FIPS mode results in a transition to the FIPS_ERROR state. The user should periodically update the seed of the FIPS approved PRNG. In lieu of updates, the FIPS approved PRNG increments the previous seed for each subsequent call, as allowed by the standard.
3. The user is responsible for using the zeroization capabilities for each data structure upon completion of the use of that structure, as specified Table 7 above. The user is also responsible for providing keys that meet the FIPS-140-2 criteria.
4. The non-approved PRNG may be used in the secure mode, but only as specified in FIPS-140-2 section 4.7.1, and for other non-cryptographic purposes.
5. A user must use only the cryptographic algorithms labeled as FIPS mode in Table 3.

5 Services Provided

Table 7 - Services Provided

| Service Class | Subclass | API Function | Purpose | Keys/CSPs | Role ³ | Applicability ⁴ |
|---------------|---|---------------------------|---|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Ciphers | AES Encryption/Decryption | aes_key_expand | Set AES Key, Zeroize AES Key | AES Key | B | F |
| | | aes_encrypt | Execute AES Cipher | | B | F |
| | | aes_decrypt | Execute AES Inverse Cipher | | B | F |
| | Triple-DES Encryption/Decryption | des_keyset | Set Triple-DES Key, Zeroize Key | Triple-DES key | B | F |
| | | des_encrypt | Execute Triple-DES Cipher | | B | F |
| | | des_decrypt | Execute Triple-DES Inverse Cipher | | B | F |
| Digests | SHA-1 digest Computation | sha1_init | Initialize hash | None | B | F |
| | | sha1_update | Hash additional message text | | B | F |
| | | sha1_finish | Finish hash | | B | F |
| | | sha1_hash | Hash a complete message | | B | F |
| | SHA-256 digest computation | sha256_init | Initialize hash | None | B | F |
| | | sha256_update | Hash additional message text | | B | F |
| | | sha256_finish | Finish hash | | B | F |
| | | sha256_hash | Hash a complete message | | B | F |
| Schemes | AES mode (scheme) encryption/decryption | aesmode_set_mode | Choose AES mode (CBC, ECB, etc) | AES key | B | F |
| | | aesmode_link_aes | Link cipher to mode | | B | F |
| | | aesmode_reset | Reset encryption mode | | B | F |
| | | aesmode_keyset | Set Key for mode, Zeroize Key | | B | F |
| | | aesmode_set_iv | Set Initial Vector for AES Mode | | B | F |
| | | aesmode_encrypt | Encrypt in selected AES mode | | B | F |
| | | aesmode_decrypt | Decrypt in selected AES mode | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_do_data_encryption | Select between voice and data encryption formats for P25 encryption | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_link_aes | Link cipher to mode | | B | F |
| aesp25_reset | Reset encryption mode | B | F | | | |

³ U = User Only, CO = Crypto-Officer Only, B = Both, N/A = Not Available

⁴ F = FIPS/Non-FIPS: Disabled on FIPS Error, N = Non-FIPS Only, NC = Non-Crypto: Always Available, N/A = Not Available

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| Service Class | Subclass | API Function | Purpose | Keys/CSPs | Role ³ | Applicability ⁴ |
|---------------|--|---------------------------|---|-----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| | | aesp25_keyset | Set Key for mode, Zeroize Key | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_set_mi | Set P25 Message Indicator (IV) | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_get_mi | Get P25 Message Indicator Value | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_encrypt | Encrypt in selected P25 mode | | B | F |
| | | aesp25_decrypt | Decrypt in selected P25 mode | | B | F |
| | Triple-DES mode (scheme) encryption/decryption | desmode_set_mode | Choose Triple-DES mode (CBC, ECB, etc) | TDES key | B | F |
| | | desmode_link_des | Link cipher to mode | | B | F |
| | | desmode_reset | Reset encryption mode | | B | F |
| | | desmode_keyset | Set Triple-DES Key for mode, Zeroize Key | | B | F |
| | | desmode_set_iv | Set Initial Vector for Mode | | B | F |
| | | desmode_encrypt | Triple-DES Encrypt in selected mode | | B | F |
| | | desmode_decrypt | Triple-DES Decrypt in selected mode | | B | F |
| | | desp25_do_data_encryption | Select between voice and data encryption formats for P25 encryption | | B | F |
| | | desp25_link_des | Link cipher to mode | | B | F |
| | | desp25_reset | Reset encryption mode | | B | F |
| | | desp25_keyset | Set Key for mode, Zeroize Key | | B | F |
| | | desp25_set_mi | Set P25 Message Indicator (IV) | | B | F |
| | | desp25_get_mi | Get P25 Message Indicator Value | | B | F |
| | | desp25_encrypt | Triple-DES Encrypt in selected P25 mode | | B | F |
| | | desp25_decrypt | Triple-DES Decrypt in selected P25 mode | | B | F |
| Key Wrap | AES key wrap [10] | aes_keywrap | Wrap a Key | AES key | B | F |
| | | aes_keyunwrap | Unwrap a key | | B | F |
| | DES key wrap | des_keywrap | Wrap a Key using DES | | B | N |
| | | des_keyunwrap | Unwrap a key using DES | | B | N |
| MACs | HMAC-SHA-1 computation | hmac_sha1_start | Set key and initialize HMAC-SHA1 authentication code computation | HMAC Key | B | F |

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| Service Class | Subclass | API Function | Purpose | Keys/CSPs | Role ³ | Applicability ⁴ |
|---------------|--------------------------|---|--|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| | | hmac_sha1_update | Include additional message text in the MAC | | B | F |
| | | hmac_sha1_finish | Complete the computation of the MAC | | B | F |
| | | hmac_sha1_authenticate | Compare/Validate HMAC | | B | F |
| | HMAC-SHA-256 computation | hmac_sha256_start | Set key and initialize HMAC-SHA256 authentication code computation | HMAC Key | B | F |
| | | hmac_sha256_update | Include additional message text in the MAC | | B | F |
| | | hmac_sha256_finish | Complete the computation of the MAC | | B | F |
| | | hmac_sha256_authenticate | Compare/Validate HMAC | | B | F |
| | AES CBC MAC computation | aescbmac_start | Set key and initialize AESCBC MAC computation | AES Key | B | N |
| | | aescbmac_update | Include additional message text in the MAC | | B | N |
| | | aescbmac_finish | Complete the computation of the MAC | | B | N |
| | | aescbmac_authenticate | Compare/validate CBC MAC | | B | N |
| | DES CBC MAC computation | descbmac_start | Set key and initialize DESCBC MAC computation | DES Key | B | N |
| | | descbmac_update | Include additional message text in the MAC | | B | N |
| | | descbmac_finish | Complete the computation of the MAC | | B | N |
| | | descbmac_authenticate | Compare/validate CBC MAC | | B | N |
| PRNGs | Non-FIPS RNG Generation | prng_init prng_init_r | Initialize Non-FIPS Pseudo-Random number generator | Seed, Seed Key | B | F |
| | | prng_update_seed prng_update_seed_r | Update Seed of Non-FIPS pseudo-random number generator | | B | F |
| | | prng_generate_bytes prng_generate_bytes_r | Generate Random Bytes | | B | F |
| | | prng_generate_bytes_fips prng_generate_bytes_rfips | Intermediate RNG processing | | | |

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| Service Class | Subclass | API Function | Purpose | Keys/CSPs | Role ³ | Applicability ⁴ |
|--------------------|------------------------------|---|---|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| | FIPS RNG Generation | fprng_init fprng_init_r | Initialize FIPS PRNG | Seed, Seed Key, AES Key | B | F |
| | | fprng_update_seed fprng_update_seed_r | Update seed of FIPS PRNG | | B | F |
| | | fprng_generate_bytes fprng_generate_bytes_r | Generate pseudo-random bytes | | B | F |
| | | fprng_generate_bytes_fips fprng_generate_bytes_rfips | Intermediate RNG processing | | | |
| Known Answer Tests | AES KAT computation | KAT_aes | AES Known-Answer Test | AES key | CO | F |
| | SHA-1 KAT computation | KAT_sha1 | SHA1 Known-Answer Test | None | CO | F |
| | HMAC-SHA-1 KAT computation | KAT_hmacsha1 | HMAC-SHA1 Known-Answer Test | HMAC Key | CO | F |
| | SHA-256 KAT computation | KAT_sha256 | SHA256 Known-Answer Test | None | CO | F |
| | HMAC-SHA-256 KAT computation | KAT_hmacsha256 | HMAC-SHA256 Known-Answer Test | HMAC Key | CO | F |
| | AES Key wrap KAT computation | KAT_aeskeywrap | AES Key-wrap Known Answer Test | AES KeyWrap key | CO | F |
| | Triple-DES KAT | KAT_des | Triple-DES Known Answer Test | Triple-DES key | CO | F |
| | AES CBC MAC KAT | KAT_aescbcmac | AES-CBCMAC Known Answer Test | AES Key | CO | N |
| FIPS Support | Other FIPS support functions | DLL_Main | DLL Initialization Function | None | N/A | N/A ⁵ |
| | | seclib_enable_fips | Attempt to enter FIPS approved mode of operation | | B | F |
| | | seclib_fips_status (Show Status Service) | Return FIPS Status | | B | NC |
| | | seclib_user_fips_error | User Initiated FIPS Error | | B | NC |
| | | seclib_enumerate_fips_errors | Enumerates the content of a historical FIPS error log | | B | NC |

⁵ Invoked by Operation System on instantiation, de-instantiation

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| Service Class | Subclass | API Function | Purpose | Keys/CSPs | Role ³ | Applicability ⁴ |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|---|--|-------------------|----------------------------|
| | | seclib_reset_fips_errorlog | Resets error log content, but not error status | None | B | NC |
| | | seclib_install_fips_callback | Installs a FIPS notification callback | | B | NC |
| | | seclib_cancel_fips_callback | Cancels a previously installed callback | | B | NF |
| Application Support | Application Support functions | otarcs_start | Initialize P25 OTAR Checksum | None | B | NC |
| | | otarcs_update | Include additional message text in OTAR checksum. | | B | NC |
| | | otarcs_finish | Complete computation of OTAR checksum | | B | NC |
| | | otarcs_authenticate | Compare/Validate OTAR Checksum | | B | NC |
| | | p25lfsr_update | Run P25 Linear Feedback Shift Register | | B | NC |
| | | p25lfsr_load | Initialize P25 Linear Feedback Shift Register | | B | NC |
| Utility | Other Utility functions | seclib_rval_text | Utility to translate return codes to text | None | B | NC |
| | | seclib_fstat_text | Utility to translate FIPS state to text | | B | NC |
| | | seclib_module_text | Utility to translate module identifiers to text | | B | NC |
| | | secrval_rval_text | Utility to support the translation codes to text | | B | NC |
| | | secutil_8_2_16 | Pack unsigned characters into 16-bit words | | B | NC |
| | | secutil_16_2_8 | Unpack 16-bit words into characters | | B | NC |
| Software Integrity Test | Software Integrity Test functions | secdll_check_certificate | | HMAC Integrity Key, embedded 256-bit plaintext key | CO | F |
| | | dllcert_check_certificate | Validates a power-on self-test certificate. | | CO | F |
| | | dllcert_rval_text | Translates dllcert error codes into human readable text | | CO | NC |
| | | dllcert_print_certtype | | | CO | |

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